Page 32 - 期貨和衍生品行業(yè)監管動(dòng)態(tài)（2024年5月）
P. 32
期貨和衍生品行業(yè)監管動(dòng)態(tài)
surveillance on these venues.
The surveillance gaps resulted from J.P. Morgan’s failure to configure certain
data feeds to ensure complete trade and order data were being ingested by J.P.
Morgan’s surveillance tools. On a specific U.S. designated contract market, J.P.
Morgan failed to ingest into its surveillance systems—and thus failed to
surveil—billions of order messages from 2014 through 2021, which, according to J.P.
Morgan, largely consisted of sponsored access trading activity for three significant
algorithmic trading firms. J.P. Morgan has represented the surveillance gaps were
fully remediated by 2023.
According to the order, while J.P. Morgan had in place a quarterly reconciliation
process designed to ensure the completeness of some order and trade data ingested
into certain surveillance systems, J.P. Morgan did not subject direct-from-exchange
data feeds to that reconciliation process, based on an erroneous assumption that data
directly from an exchange was from a “golden source” and thus did not need to be
tested.
The CFTC acknowledges and appreciates the assistance of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in this matter.
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8914-24
22
